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Chapter 12

Kenneth L. Alford

Indian Relations
in Utah during
the Civil War

N

ative Americans1 played a small, but
interesting, role during the Civil War.
During the first year of the war, the U.S.
secretary of the interior reported that “our
Indian affairs are in a very unsettled and
unsatisfactory condition. The spirit of rebellion against the authority of the government,
which has precipitated a large number of
States into open revolt, has been instilled into
a portion of the Indian tribes by emissaries
from the insurrectionary States.”2 Both Union
and Confederate armies courted tribe members in an effort to recruit additional soldiers
and were met with some success. Confederate General Stand Watie, for example, the last
Southern general to surrender to Union forces
(in June 1865), was a Cherokee Indian.3
While most regions of the country experienced few Indian problems during the war,
Utah had to contend with numerous challenges. What happened in Utah when settlers
and Indians came into contact is the same
story that occurred throughout the early

history of the United States. Settlers arrived;
Indians were displaced. In Utah Territory it
happened quickly. From the arrival of the
first Mormon pioneers, it was just over thirty
years until the last Indians were removed to
government reservations. This essay provides
an overview of the complicated and often
violent relationships that existed in Utah Territory during the Civil War between Indians,
settlers, and the federal government.

Utah’s Indians
Several Indian tribes lived in Utah Territory during the nineteenth century with three
tribes accounting for the m
 ajority—Utes (often
referred to as Utahs—the namesake of Utah
Territory), Shoshones (sometimes referred to
as Snakes), and Paiutes (who lived in the central and southern parts of the territory).4 Members of smaller and neighboring tribes, such
as Bannock, Goshute, and Washoe, also lived
within the territorial boundary. As Jacob Forney, a Utah Territory superintendent of Indian
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Affairs who was later dismissed for mismanagement, explained in September 1858, “The
principal tribes are, of course, divided into a
great number of small bands but all submit to
the authority of one or the other of the chiefs
of their respective tribes.”5
The exact number of Indians who lived in
Utah Territory is unknown. An 1861 report
from J. F. Collins, Utah superintendent of
Indian Affairs, acknowledged that no one
“had ever been able to obtain satisfactory
information in regard to their numbers.”
Collins’s estimate at the beginning of the

Civil War suggested, though, that there may
have been fifteen to twenty thousand Indians
prior to the arrival of the first Mormon settlers.6 The best approximation prior to the
Civil War may be an estimate included in
Superintendent Forney’s 1859 annual report
to the federal commissioner of Indian Affairs
(see figure 1).
Indian Tribe or Band
Sho-sho-nes or Snakes

Estimate
4,500

Ban-nacks

500

Uinta Utes

1,000

Spanish Fork and San Pete farms
Pah-vant (Utes)

900
700

Pey-utes (South)

2,200

Pey-utes (West)

6,000

Elk mountain Utes

2,000

Wa-sho of Honey lake

700
Total

18,500

Figure 1. Supposed total number of Indians in Utah Territory
(1858). Source: Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Report of the Secretary
of the Interior for the Year 1858 (Washington, DC: George W.
Bowman, 1859), 365. (“Farms” were Indian reservations.
Original spelling retained.)

Living conditions in Utah Territory were
difficult for everyone—but especially so for
Indians. According to Benjamin Davies, Utah

Territory’s superintendent of Indian Affairs
in 1861, Utah’s Indians were “unquestionably the poorest Indians on the continent.”7
In an 1850 Indian agent’s annual report,
Paiutes, for example, were categorized as
“benumbed by cold, and enfeebled, intellectually and physically, by the food upon
which they subsist; it consisting only of roots,
vermin, insects of all kinds, and everything
that creeps, crawls, swims, flies, or bounds,
they may chance to overtake.”8 Many Indians
struggled to stay alive and eagerly consumed
“everything containing a life-sustaining element, such as hares, rabbits, antelope, deer,
bear, elk, dogs, lizzards [sic], snakes, crickets,
grasshoppers, ants, roots, grass, seeds, bark,
etc. . . . With some of the Indians stealing
cattle, horses, mules, &c, is a matter of
necessity—steal or starve.”9 While sent to
Utah to serve both the government and the
Indians, the personal prejudices of individual
Indian agents often crept into reports to their
superiors as evidenced by the 1850 report
of Indian agent J. S. Calhoun, who charged
that Indians “feed upon their own children.
Such a people should not be permitted to
live within the limits of the United States,
and must be elevated in the scale of human
existence, or exterminated.”10 Yet the same
Indians were defined by other Indian agents
as “very industrious,” “honest, amiable,” and
“peaceable,” who “conducted themselves
well” and were “friendly disposed toward us
[Indian agents] destitute as they are.”11

Prior to the Civil War
Utah’s first Mormon settlers arrived in the
Salt Lake Valley in July 1847. Mormons identified American Indians as a lost branch of the
house of Israel and felt a sense of responsibility to convert and civilize them. There were

Indian Relations in Utah during the Civil War
many Indian baptisms, but conflict occurred
more frequently than conversion.
For security reasons, new Mormon settlements often began with the building of an
enclosed fort. Lieutenant John W. Gunnison,
a U.S. Army topographic engineer sent to
Utah in the early 1850s to survey potential
rail routes, described the first settlement in
Salt Lake City: “A fort enclosing about forty
acres was built, by facing log-houses inward,
and picketing four gateways on each side of
the square, making a line nearly a mile and a
half in length—the timber being hauled several miles, and cut in the distant kanyons.”12
Indians did not appear to be concerned
with the initial arrival of Mormons in the Salt
Lake Valley because that valley was a neutral buffer zone between the Ute, G
 oshute,
and Shoshone tribes. Trouble began when
the Mormons expanded into Utah Valley.
The Mormon fort in Provo was built on
a 
centuries-old Indian campsite that was
near several major hunting trails.13 During
1848, just one year after the first pioneers
arrived, settlers suffered attacks by a band of
Shoshones and sought to administer a “chastisement” of their own to the Indians.14 The
following year, in the winter of 1849, Indians
“became insolent in Utah Valley, killed cattle
and boasted of it, entered houses and frightened women and children, took provisions
forcibly, and compelled those on the farms to
retire within the fort.”15 In 1850, during what
is sometimes termed the Timpanogos War,
Mormon forces from Salt Lake and Utah Valleys attacked and killed dozens of Indians.16
Additional Indian-settler skirmishes, such
as the Walker War in 1853–54 (named after
the Timpanogos Ute Indian chief Wakara),
continued throughout the 1850s.17 Gunnison wryly noted, “It is a curious matter of
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reflection that those [Mormons] whose mission it is to convert these aborigines by the
sword of the spirit should thus be obliged
to destroy them.”18 (Gunnison himself was
killed by Utes in October 1853 near Fillmore, then the capital of Utah Territory.)
Prior to the Utah War (1857–58), Indian
relations and diplomacy had been a shared
responsibility, divided by proximity and
interest between the Mormon population
and federal Indian agents. After the Utah
War, Indian policy was most often made and
enforced by the U.S. Army and the federal
government’s Indian agents. Among the many
challenges this presented was that “army
leaders and their volunteers often had little
training in and patience for the protocols of
Indian diplomacy.”19
According to an 1861 government report,
among the many causes of Indian hardship
were “the natural poverty of the country, the
destruction of the wild game by the introduction of white men, and the selfish policy
of the Mormon people”—although exactly
what that policy might have been was left
unstated.20 Perhaps it was the fact that the
arrival of Mormon pioneers upset the delicate
and fragile natural balance within the region.
Indians were continually being displaced as
the Mormons established new settlements.
Competition for limited natural resources
became “a constant source of irritation and
vexation to the whites” as well as to the Indians.21 Indians were soon “deprived of their
accustomed means of subsistence” and were
“driven to the alternative of laying violent
hands upon the property of the whites or of
perishing by want.”22
Violence between Indians was another
problem, with intermittent conflicts occurring within and between the numerous tribes
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Paiutes, who were generally nonequestrian, tended to move to reservations and adopt settler ways more easily than other tribes
within the territory (circa 1860). (Library of Congress)

and bands.23 Lieutenant Gunnison observed
that the “different tribes of the Utahs are frequently at war with each other.”24 Comparing
Utah’s local Indian wars to the Civil War, one
Deseret News writer suggested in 1861, “In
their way, and according to their numbers,
they [warring Indians] may destroy as many
lives as the armies of the North and South, in
the civil war now raging in the States.”25 The
fact that many Ute and Shoshone bands were
equestrian, while Paiutes seldom had horses,
influenced the relationship each tribe developed with Mormon settlers. Horses enabled
a migratory lifestyle that made their owners
less interested in farming on government
reservations. Utes also captured and enslaved

nonequestrian Indians, which caused many
Paiutes to seek protection from nearby Mormon settlements.26
Disease (including several new diseases
introduced into Indian communities by contact with whites) and violent conflicts with
settlers contributed to a decline in the Indian
population.27 Indians within Utah Territory
did not fare well in the years immediately
preceding the Civil War; they had “degenerated very rapidly during the last twelve years
or since white men have got among them.”28
In 1860, Utah Indian agent A. Humphreys
reported that “the sufferings of these poor
Indians during the past winter were horrible,
many of them dying from starvation and
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exposure. It was a common circumstance to
find them frozen to death. . . . On several
occasions I parted with my own blankets to
bury them in.”29

Federal Indian Officials
Congress created the Utah Territorial
Indian Agency in February 1851, just one
year after Utah was organized as a territory.30
Throughout much of its history as a territory,
Utah had a difficult and strained relationship
with many of the federal appointees sent to
direct its affairs. Utahns wanted to govern
themselves and viewed federal office holders
as an unnecessary burden. The Utah War,
which ended less than three years before the
beginning of the Civil War, was caused in part
by the role that disgruntled territorial federal
officials played in shaping the Buchanan
administration’s view of Utah’s perceived
rebellion. Relations were particularly bad
when it came to Utah’s Indian superintendents and agents, many of whom recognized
that a Utah appointment would do little to
further their career. Problems ranged from
apathy and incompetence to open corruption. Part of Utah’s Indian difficulties must be
laid at the feet of Utah’s Indian officials.
In a lengthy October 1861 editorial, the
Deseret News summarized the frustration
Utahns had with many federal Indian agents.
While recognizing that some “of the government officials who have been sent here
within the last three or four years have been
honorable men, and a few others might be
called so without much perversion of language, having done no particular harm to
any one excepting to themselves,” the News
categorized a “majority of the United States’
officers” as being “neither moral, honest, or
virtuous.” Federal officials were generally
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categorized as alcoholics who “worship[ped]
at the shrine of Bacchus.” While the newspaper took most federal appointees to task,
one category of government workers “who
have come here since Buchanan’s disastrous
expedition was planned and executed [the
Utah War]” was singled out for especially
harsh rhetoric—“those connected with the
Indian Department.” Indian superintendents
and agents were criticized for being “unbusinesslike,” committing numerous “unlawful
acts,” and for seldom attending “to the duties
of their office.” The paper charged that Utah
residents were left to feed and clothe “the
Indians that were in their midst and around
about them, and when the various bands have
been hostile towards each other, or towards
the whites, waged war upon them and committed depredations the superintendents and
their subordinates, with few exceptions,” the
paper continued, the Indian Department took
“little or no notice of their belligerent and
lawless proceedings.” In what might be an
overstatement based on the emotion of the
time, the editorial suggested that “superintendents and agents have held out inducements
to the Indians to steal the stock of the settlers,
informing them where they could find a market for all they stole which they did not need
for their own use. It is notorious that when
horses, mules and cattle have been stolen
by the natives and known to have been thus
taken and in their possession, but feeble or no
efforts have been made, generally speaking,
to recover the property and restore it to the
owners; and seemingly the more lawless acts
the Indians committed, the better were those
government functionaries pleased with their
doings.” It was the opinion of the Deseret News
that to list all of the “ridiculous and unlawful
acts” committed “would require much time
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and space” and “would be exceedingly bulky.”
The only remedy available was to “sincerely
hope that no other than honorable men will
be appointed to or hold office in this Territory
hereafter.” If any more “miserable specimens
of humanity be sent here in that capacity, it is
hoped that they will be induced, shortly after
their arrival, to retrace their steps or continue
their journey across the continent.”31

Indian Treaties
and Reservations
The United States government officially
recognized each Indian tribe as a separate
nation, which meant that Indian relations
were the responsibility of the federal government and not individual states or territories.32
Legal issues, such as land titles, were usually
determined through treaties. When Utah was
established as a territory, though, the federal
government “took over Utah without a single
Ute land title settled and without any treaty
of cession negotiated.”33 Land ownership
was problematic from the earliest days of the
territory. When Mormon pioneers arrived in
1847, the land they settled was claimed by
Mexico and occupied by Indians—neither
of whom could provide a transferable title.
Further complicating the situation, when
Mormon pioneers settled along the northern
Wasatch Front, they chose land that was
claimed by several tribes.34
Although each tribe was formally viewed
as a separate sovereign nation, the treaty
system never treated Indians equally or fairly.
Indians were always “at a disadvantage. Treaties were written in English, and often the
terms were not explained adequately to the
Indians. Land ownership and government
systems were concepts often foreign to Indians. And the government often negotiated
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with persons whom it had selected but who
were not the accepted leaders of the entire
tribe.”35 Indians were viewed as a nuisance
that needed to be contained, and treaties
were the legal mechanism to do so. The first
treaty—negotiated between Mormon leaders and Ute chiefs—was signed on December 30, 1849.36 A second treaty, for which no
record exists today, apparently followed in
April 1850.37
The reality was that “the distressed condition of the Indians in this Territory” became
worse each year as more settlers arrived and
taxed the limited natural resources even further. Beginning in 1851, in an effort to both
assist and contain Indians within the territory,
Mormons established a series of Indian farms
(reservations) to assist Indians in learning to
feed themselves.38 With Indian poverty and
starvation increasing each year, the “extension of the farming system” was seen as “the
proper remedy” to help Indians become selfsufficient again.39 As Luther Mann Jr., one of
Utah’s numerous Indian agents, wrote, “Wild
Indians, like wild horses, must be corralled
upon reservations.”40 The government’s goal
was to “entirely reclaim them from savage life
and cause them to become useful and good
citizens.”41 To domesticate and feed the territory’s Indian population, several government
reservations were established in Utah before
the Civil War. Using Mormon Indian farms as
the foundation, three reservations—Spanish
Fork reservation in Utah Valley south of Provo,
the San Pete reservation in San Pete Valley,
and the Corn Creek reservation located near
Fillmore (approximately one hundred miles
north of Mountain Meadows)—were established by the Utah Indian Agency in 1854.
Two additional reservations, Deep Creek and
Ruby Valley farms, were established during
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spring 1858, shortly before the Utah War’s
conclusion; those reservations became part
of Nevada Territory in 1861.42
Living conditions on the reservations were
always difficult as the newly minted Indian
farmers battled drought, crickets, disease,
hunger, government bureaucracy, and a host
of cultural challenges, as well as the fact that
the reservations themselves were often not
maintained “in a promising condition.”43 In
1861, a Utah Indian agent complained that
an army officer had “taken away many of the
implements, such as ploughs, hoes, harrows,
and wagons” from Indians at both the Corn
Creek and San Pete reservations, which “quite
discouraged the poor Indians” and caused
them “to ask if the great father has thrown
them away.”44 The result was that only a small
percentage of Utah’s Indians chose to relocate
to a reservation by the beginning of the Civil
War. Territorial Indian agents often sent optimistic annual reports regarding their efforts to
alleviate Indian starvation and suffering, and
those reports frequently had some version of
the sentiment that the suffering, “I trust, will be
obviated next year.”45 Indian agents appealed
“in the sweet name of ‘charity’” that something
be done to better the condition of the Indians
because their “present state is intolerable,”
but the agents recognized that genuine relief
would not be forthcoming that year.46
In 1861, a few months after the Civil War
began, Utah’s three main Indian farms—
Spanish Fork, Corn Creek, and San Pete—
were declared as being deficient by Utah
Indian agents. The Spanish Fork reservation
was characterized as being “surrounded by
a large Mormon population who have no
particular regard for the welfare of the Indians from the fact that they have surveyed
said reservation with the avowed intention

209

of taking possession of it.” The Corn Creek
reservation was “closely surrounded by white
settlements which renders it very nearly
valueless as an Indian reservation because of
the Indians continually coming into contact
with the whites,” and the San Pete reservation
was said to have been “worthless and abandoned by the superintendent in the spring of
1860.”47

The Coming of the Civil War
For most settlers in Utah Territory, Indian
relations were probably more important
than events in the distant civil war. As talk
of Southern secession increased following
Lincoln’s November 1860 election to the
presidency, a letter from Carson City, Utah
Territory, published in January 1861 may
have adequately summed up local residents’
feelings regarding the coming war as well as
their Indian problems. The writer stated, “We
have nothing to do with Secession here, and
it does not trouble us. When we want to fight
all we have to do is to give one shot in the
direction of an Indian camp, and then we got
it [all the fighting we can handle].”48
The Civil War influenced Utah Territory’s
Indian policy in ways that could not have
been envisioned at the beginning of the war.
The last commander of the army’s Department of Utah and Camp Floyd (renamed Fort
Crittenden) was Colonel Philip St. George
Cooke. A native of Virginia, Cooke (not to be
confused with the similarly named and fellow Virginian Philip St. George Cocke—who
served the Confederacy as a brigadier general) had ties to Mormons that stretched back
to his service with the Mormon Battalion in
the 1840s during the Mexican War.49 Cooke’s
southern roots and secessionist family members—J. E. B. Stuart, the famous Confederate
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cavalry commander, was Cooke’s son-in-law,
in Salt Lake City with “Mormon pioneers and
and his own son, John Rogers Cooke, fought
Nauvoo Legion militia” members during the
in the Army of Northern Virginia as an infantry
city’s 1861 Fourth of July parade.53
Utah’s geographic isolation diminished in
brigade commander—caused some concern
October 1861 when the telegraph reached
within the army, but Colonel Cooke declared
Salt Lake City and linked the nation together.
his loyalty to the Union and earned the rank
When the soldiers stationed in Utah were
of brevet major general by the war’s end.
withdrawn in 1861 to fight
Under Cooke’s command,
the war in the East, the teleIndian policy in Utah Terrigraph lines, mail lines, and
tory had been dominated by
emigrant trails, as well as the
frequently changing Indian
citizens who lived within the
superintendents and agents.
territory, were left with little
That would change the folprotection. With the telelowing year with the arrival
graph’s arrival, Utah’s new
of Colonel Patrick Edward
superintendent for Indian
Connor and his California
Affairs, Dyman S. Wood,
Volunteers.
warned Washington officials
In May 1861, hostile
that the “establishment of the
actions by Indians on the
overland daily mail and teleemigrant trails caused Utah’s
graph lines and their recent
governor, Alfred Cumming,
completion through this
to request that a detachment
Territory—consummations
of Union soldiers from Fort
Patrick Edward Connor (1820–91)
advocated
a
disciplinarian
approach
of such vital importance to
Crittenden be sent to guard
toward Indians. Connor was promoted to
the people throughout the
the Overland Trail “for
brigadier general following the Bear River
Massacre
in
January
1863.
(Utah
State
Union—render it necessary
the protection of the Mail,
Historical Society)
that steps should be immeExpress, and emigrants,
diately taken by the government to prevent
and, if need be, for the chastisement of the
the possibility of their being interrupted by
Indians.”50 Soldiers were not sent at that time
but were ordered instead to leave Utah and
the Indians.”54
Tensions in Utah continued to rise, and by
join the growing fight in the East. In June,
mid-April 1862, Frank Fuller (acting governor),
the New York Times reported that Utah’s govI. F. Kinney (Utah Supreme Court chief justice),
ernor felt that removing the soldiers “would
Edward R. Fox (Utah’s surveyor general), and
leave the inhabitants too much exposed to
51
officials from the Overland Mail Company and
attacks from unfriendly Indians.” As the
soldiers from Fort Crittenden marched east,
Pacific Telegraph Company appealed directly
Indians “helped themselves to a goodly toll
to Edwin M. Stanton, President Lincoln’s
of Army cattle”—stealing over one hundred
secretary of war, for assistance in controlling
52
head. While a few Indians took advantage
“the Indians in Utah” who were robbing and
of the distraction offered by the Civil War, the
destroying Overland Mail Company stations
majority did not. Some Indians even marched
and killing cattle. They asked Secretary Stanton

Indian Relations in Utah during the Civil War

211

to “put in service” under the command of
of robbery and murder on Sublette’s Cutoff
James D. Doty, Utah’s superintendent of Indian
[an alternate and fifty-three-mile shorter
Affairs, “a regiment [of] mounted rangers from
route on the Oregon Trail in Wyoming and
inhabitants of the Territory.”55 Yet just three
southern Idaho], which exhibit[s] beyond
days later, Brigham Young informed John M.
all doubt that the Indians have thrown off
Bernhisel, Utah Territory’s original delegate in
all restraint, and indulge their thieving and
the U.S. House of Representatives: “So far as I
murderous propensities without the slightest
know, the Indians in Utah are
regard to the sex, age, or
unusually quiet and instead
condition of the subjects
of 2,000 hostile Shoshones
of the attack.” The newscoming into our northern
paper blamed much of the
settlements, Washhekuk,
Indians’ behavior on “the
their chief, has wintered in
unfortunate associations
the city and near it, perfectly
they had some years ago
friendly, and is about to go to
with a few renegade whites,
his band. Besides, the militia
. . . and as it is much easier
of Utah are ready and able, as
to descend a hill than it is
they ever have been, to take
to climb one, the red skins
care of all the Indians, and
took much easier their lesBrigham Young (1801–77), president of
are able and willing to protect
sons of corruption than
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
the mail line if called upon so
their lessons of right.”
Saints, advocated a gentler, more mentoring
approach to Indian relations than the stern
to do. The statements of the
The journalist was certain
policies followed by the army. (Photo by
aforesaid telegram are withthat until “another kind of
Charles R. Savage, Harold B. Lee Library,
Brigham
Young
University)
out foundation in truth so far
relationship [is] established
as we know.”56
between the Indians and
On April 28, Brigham Young received a
those who should see to them, no life will be
telegram requesting that an active duty cavsecure on [the Sublette] road.”58
In May 1862, after learning that solalry company be raised within Utah. During
diers would again be stationed in Utah, a
the ninety-day period (May–August 1862)
New York Times reporter suggested that it was
that the Utah cavalry company, under the
“much more likely that these Gentile Soldiers
command of Captain Lot Smith, guarded a
from California will create difficulties in Utah
portion of the Overland Trail, the New York
than that they will ever settle them. If the
Times reported that Indians were “again
troops are designed to operate against the
troublesome” and had cut telegraph lines,
fragments of dying savages west of the Rocky
stolen one hundred and fifty mail animals,
Mountains, we are likely to have an Indian
killed employees of the mail company as well
war on our hands this Summer, which,
as some emigrants, and burned down one
though barren enough of value, will be fertile
or two mail stations.57 As the Utah Cavalry
ended their active duty military service, the
enough of expenses.”59 At the beginning of
August, an Indian chief named Little Soldier
Deseret News reported that “during the past
warned Doty and others that Shoshone and
few weeks we have heard of several instances
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Department of the Interior, issued an official
Bannock Indians “inhabiting the northern
warning to “all persons contemplating the
part of this Territory and the southern porcrossing of the plains this fall, to Utah or
tion of eastern Washington Territory have
the Pacific coast, that there is good reason
united their forces for the purpose of making
to apprehend hostilities
war upon and committing
on the part of the Bannack
depredations on the propand Shoshone or Snake
erty of the white people.”
Indians, as well as the IndiLittle Soldier warned “very
ans upon the plains and
urgently” of a “great danger”
along the Platte river.” Mix
and cautioned settlers to
reported that those Indians
“have their guns with them
were “numerous, powerat all times in the cañons
60
ful, and warlike” and could
and in their fields.” Also
during August, James D.
make crossing the plains
Doty, Utah’s Indian Affairs
“extremely perilous.”64 The
following day, Luther Mann
superintendent and future
Jr., an Indian agent at Fort
governor, reported a series
Chief Little Soldier, a Weber Ute, warned
Bridger, charged Shoshone
of Indian attacks: several
whites of a possible Indian uprising
during
the
summer
of
1862.
and Bannock Indians with
immigrant wagon trains
(Utah State Historical society)
“some of the most brutal
had been robbed; “many
murders ever perpetrated upon this contipeople killed;” “many murders committed;”
nent” and stated he was certain “that a genand hundreds of head of livestock had been
61
eral outbreak of hostilities will take place
stolen. Historian Brigham D. Madsen suggested that during that time perhaps “as many
throughout this entire region of country.”65
It was into that tense environment that
as 400 people lost their lives as a result of
U.S. Army California Volunteers under the
raids and murders at the hands of Shoshoni,
command of Colonel Connor entered Utah
Bannock, and Northern Paiute warriors on
in late fall 1862 and established Camp
the Humboldt and Snake rivers.”62
Concern regarding real and potential
Douglas on the foothills overlooking Salt
Indian actions continued to build. By the
Lake City. An eastern newspaper reported
end of August, Ben Holladay, who owned
that Colonel Connor’s “particular business
stage routes and the federal contract to
is generally understood to be to keep the
deliver mail to Salt Lake City, reported, in a
Western mail and emigrant route clear of
classic case of overstatement, that a “general
Indians.”66
war with nearly all the tribes of Indians east
Differing Policy Approaches
of the Missouri River is close at hand. I am
Connor’s arrival brought into sharper
expecting daily an interruption on my [mail]
focus two contrasting and coexistent philosoline, and nothing but prompt and decisive
phies regarding Indian relations. The first,
action on the part of government will pre63
epitomized by Brigham Young, might be
vent it.” Three weeks later, Charles E. Mix,
acting commissioner of Indian Affairs in the
termed a “welfare approach,” and the second,
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Chief Washakie (front, center) with members of his tribe. (Utah State Historical Society)

personified by Patrick Connor and the U.S.
Army, was a “disciplinarian approach.”
The welfare approach. Brigham Young
taught that Indians should generally be
treated with kindness. He believed that Indians did not commit aggressive acts “without
provocation on the part of the whites.”67 His
Indian philosophy may be summed up in an
address he gave in the Salt Lake Tabernacle on
March 8, 1863 (during a period of particularly
tense relations with Colonel Connor and the
soldiers stationed at Camp Douglas). From
the Tabernacle podium, Young declared: “I
will, comparatively speaking, take one plug
of tobacco, a shirt and three cents’ worth of
paint, [give it to the Indians] and save more
life and hinder more Indian depredations
than they [the federal government] can by

expending millions of dollars vested in an
army to fight and kill the Indians. Feed and
clothe them a little and you will save life; fight
them, and you pave the way for the destruction of the innocent. This will be found out
after a while, but now it is not known except
by comparatively a few.”68 Commenting on the
federal government’s poor record of honoring
treaty obligations with Indians, Young stated:
I will ask every person who is
acquainted with the history of the
colonization of the Continent of North
and South America, if they ever knew
any colony of whites to get along any
better with their savage neighbors than
the inhabitants of Utah have done.
Talk about making treaties with the
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Indians! Has there been any one treaty
with the Indians fulfilled in good faith
by the Government? If there is one, I
wish you would let me know. But we
call them savages, while at the same
time the whites too often do as badly
as they have done, and worse, when
difference of intelligence and training
are taken into account. This has been
so in almost every case of difficulty
with the red skins. When soldiers have
pounced upon these poor, ignorant,
low, degraded, miserable creatures,
mention a time, if you can, when they
have spared their women and children.
They have indiscriminately massacred
the helpless, the blind, the old, the
infant, and the mother.69
President Young suggested that his followers should “take the Indians, become
acquainted with them and know their feelings
and spirits and you will find as large a proportion that have good feelings and spirits as
among the whites. . . . If you see an Indian give
him a biscuit instead of half an ounce of lead,
then they will be your friends.”70 In remarks
made in Salt Lake City’s public square to
emigrants passing through Utah in July 1863,
Young taught, “You have heard of Indian hostilities, . . . but you will have no trouble with
them, if you will do right. I have always told
the traveling public that it is much cheaper to
feed the Indians than to fight them. Give them
a little bread and meat, a little sugar, a little
tobacco, or a little of anything you have which
will conciliate their feelings and make them
your friends. . . . I am satisfied that among
the red men of the mountains and the forest
you can find as many good, honest persons as
among the Anglo Saxon race.”71

Not surprisingly, Brigham Young’s approach
made him popular with many Indian bands.
He was so popular, in fact, that O. H. Irish,
Utah’s superintendent of Indian Affairs, wrote
in 1865, “The fact exists, however much some
might prefer it should be otherwise, that he
[Young] has pursued so kind and conciliatory
a policy with the Indians that it has given him
great influence over them.”72
The disciplinarian approach. In contrast to
Brigham Young’s welfare-like approach, the
U.S. army in general, and Colonel Connor
specifically, often favored a strict policy of
Indian correction and punishment. Connor’s
Indian policy was outlined to Major Edward
McGarry, one of his subordinate officers, in a
September 29, 1862, dispatch—issued even
before his soldiers reached Salt Lake City.
Connor instructed McGarry that if hostile
Indians resisted capture “you will destroy
them.”73 If any Indians were known to have
committed murder, “immediately hang
them, and leave their bodies thus exposed
as an example of what evil-doers may expect
while I command in this district. . . . This
course may seem harsh and severe, but I
desire that the order may be rigidly enforced,
as I am satisfied that in the end it will prove
the most merciful.”74 Connor also ordered
McGarry, though, that in “no instance will
you molest women or children.”75 Connor’s
views reflected those of General George
Wright, commander of the Department of
the Pacific and Connor’s immediate supervisor, who wrote that Indian difficulties “have
been growing worse and worse for years, and
I am determined to settle them now for the
last time. Every Indian you may capture, and
who has been engaged in hostilities present
or past, shall be hung on the spot. Spare the
women and children.”76
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In 1863, Utah governor James D. Doty
to follow his policies,”78 just as Patrick Conreflected the army’s attitude when he shared
nor recognized that force was not always juswith Colonel Connor that many Indians who
tified. With few exceptions, though, once the
were “suing for peace—proarmy returned in 1862, the
test that they are friendly to
Mormons generally deferred
the whites and are afraid the
to military authority regardsoldiers will kill them. This
ing Indian relations and “the
is the condition in which I
Saints tended merely to look
desire to see all the tribes
on as bystanders.”79
Little love was lost bein this Territory. They now
tween Connor and Young.
realize the fact that the
One contributing factor to
Americans are the masters
Connor’s dislike of almost
of this country, and it is my
all things Mormon is that he
purpose to make them conbelieved Latter-day Saints
tinue to feel and to acknowlencouraged and instigated
edge it. Without this there
James Duane Doty (1799–1865) filled
several government appointments in
Indian raids throughout his
can be no permanent peace
Utah Territory—first as superintendent
area of responsibility. “Morhere and no security upon
of Indian Affairs and then as governor
(1863–65).
He
had
previously
served
mons,” Connor complained
the routes of travel. . . . Your
in the U.S. House of Representatives
to his superiors, “instead of
troops have displaced the
(from Wisconsin’s Third Congressional
District) and as governor of the Wisconsin
assisting to punish Indians
Mormon power over these
Territory. (Utah State Historical Society)
for bad conduct actually
Indians.”77
encouraged them. . . . From
Indian Policy in Practice
the evidence before me I am well satisfied
Differences in the Indian policies of
that the Mormons are the real instigators [of
Colonel Connor and President Young quickly
trouble].”80 He believed “the Indians are completely under his [Brigham Young’s] control
became apparent after the army’s arrival.
and do just as he tells them.”81
Neither the welfare approach nor the opposBrigham Young, on the other hand, had
ing disciplinarian approach, however, could
little tolerance for the army’s forceful and
resolve every trying situation. The reality
often violent Indian policy. Young was also
was, of course, much more complicated. “The
a realist, though, and he recognized that
simple fact,” as historian John Alton Peterson
“there are a few Indians that are wickedly
observed, “was that two honorable peoples
disposed, just as it is among all white settlewere hopelessly trapped not only by their
ments” and encouraged his listeners to “keep
own cultures, goals, and interests but also by
your horses under a strong guard and then
the larger political and national forces of their
you will be safe.”82 Increasing Indian hostility
time. Both were victims of violent demothroughout 1861 and 1862 meant that the
graphic and political changes that threatened
optimistic “feed-rather-than-fight policy was
their very existences as communities. . . .
given lip service” but there were increasing
The simple truth is that, try as he [Brigham
strains on adhering to it as settlers desired a
Young] might, he could not induce his people
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Looking east across the site of the Bear River Massacre. Colonel Connor and his soldiers came down the bank below where the ranch
stands on the hill. (Utah State Historical Society)

more permanent resolution to their Indian
problems.83

Bear River Massacre
Connor’s disciplinarian Indian policy was
forcibly demonstrated at the Battle of Bear
River (now more frequently referred to as the
Bear River Massacre) in January 1863 about
150 miles north of Camp Douglas near Preston, Idaho. Several historians have argued
that given the circumstances of that time,
the massacre was probably inevitable.84 Six
weeks before the battle, a report in the Deseret
News expressed hope that “the Indians [will
be] so thoroughly whipped that they will
retire into the Bannock country [in Idaho],
there to remain during the winter.” If not,
the reporter feared, settlements in northern
Utah and southern Idaho “will not be as safe
hereafter as they were before the expedition
was sent out to punish them.”85 A few weeks

before the battle, thousands of Indians had
assembled in the Bear River area to hold a
Warm Dance—a gathering designed to “drive
out the cold of winter and hasten the warmth
of spring.” Most of the Indians left the area
following completion of the Warm Dance
ceremonies.86 If Connor had attacked earlier
that month, many more Indians presumably
would have been killed.
Two weeks before the battle, there were
reports of murders committed by Indians
“to avenge the blood of their comrades,
who were killed by the soldiers” during the
previous fall.87 The day before the battle, the
Deseret News reported that Colonel Connor
and four companies of cavalry had marched
through Salt Lake City “with the expectation,
no doubt, of surprising the Indians.” The
report surmised that Connor’s forces would
“come up with the red skins about eighty or
ninety miles from here on Bear River, and
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that with ordinary good luck the volunteers
will ‘wipe them out.’ . . . The Indian has ever
been a difficult subject to handle with nicety
and justice.”88
Some Indians reportedly escaped prior to
the attack. During the night of January 27,
1863, an older Indian by the name of Tindup “foresaw the calamity which was about
to take place. In a dream he saw his people
being killed by pony soldiers. He told others
of his dream and urged them to move out of
the area that night.” Some families believed
him, left the area, and survived.89
Early in the morning of January 29, 1863,
with Colonel Connor commanding, soldiers
attacked and killed at least 224 Indians; only
fourteen soldiers were lost.90 The nineteenthcentury Utah historian Hubert Howe Bancroft
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observed, “Had the savages committed this
deed, it would pass into history as a butchery
or a massacre.”91 Commended by General
Henry W. Halleck, U.S. army general-inchief, for his “heroic conduct and brilliant
victory on Bear River,” Connor was promoted
to brigadier general on March 29, 1863.92

Following the Massacre
Less than one week after the battle, the
Deseret News reported that “Col. Connor and
the Volunteers who went north last week to
look after the Indians on the Bear River have,
in a very short space of time, done a larger
amount of Indian killing than ever fell to the
lot of any single expedition of which we have
any knowledge.”93 Had it occurred during
a period of peace, the attack at Bear River

This painting, entitled Returning from the Battle of Bear River, hangs in the Fort Douglas Officers Club. The man waving his hat is
Orrin Porter Rockwell, and the other central figure on horseback is Colonel Patrick Edward Connor. (Utah State Historical Society)
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would have been front page news across the
country. As it was, the battle received little
notice in the American press outside of the
West, because of more pressing news from
the Civil War.
Connor worked quickly to capitalize on
his victory. Shortly after the battle, which
according to Bancroft “completely broke
the power and spirit of the Indians,”94 Connor held a conference with Indian leaders
near Brigham City. His official dispatch to
his superiors reported that he informed the
Indians “that the troops had been sent to this
region to protect good Indians and whites
and equally to punish bad Indians and bad
whites; that it was my determination to visit
the most summary punishment—even to
extermination—on Indians who committed
depredations upon the lives and property
of emigrants and settlers.”95 The prevalent
popular sentiment regarding Indians was
summed up in February 1863 by a New
York Times report from Utah: “If an Indian
be starving, he must and will steal. Notwithstanding, if Col. Connor succeeds in leaving
a few of the really guilty Indians beneath the
sod, it will be a good thing, and may teach a
necessary and salutary lesson.”96 In April and
May 1863, there were again reports of hostile
Indian activity across northern Utah—west
of Utah Lake, at Pleasant Grove, near Payson, outside North Ogden, five miles east of
Brigham City, in southern Idaho, and along
the Overland Trail mail routes.97
In December 1863, during his annual
message to the legislative assembly of Utah,
Amos Reed, the territory’s acting governor,
claimed that the soldiers had achieved a “termination of hostilities and depredations by
the Indians,” but he informed the legislature
that the “condition of the Utah Indians in
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this Territory will [still] require your future
attention. Roaming as they do through all our
settlements south of this City, they are and
have been since the settlement of the Territory, a great annoyance to, and a continual,
burthensome tax upon the people.”98
News of the January 1863 massacre at
Bear River spread quickly among both Indian
and white populations, and it generally
had the effect that General Connor desired.
Several treaties were signed in rapid succession: a treaty at Fort Bridger with Shoshone
Indians (signed July 2, 1863), a treaty of
Box Elder (signed July 30, 1863), a treaty at
Tuilla (Tooele) Valley (signed on October 12,
1863—that treaty contained a special provision that required that “Indians agree to give
up their roving life and settle upon a reservation whenever the President of the United
States shall deem it expedient for them”),
and a treaty at Soda Springs (signed on October 14, 1863).99
Then, as now, Congress often moved
slowly. Although President Lincoln had
signed an executive order in October 1861
creating a large Indian reservation in Utah at
Uintah Valley, it was not until May 5, 1864,
that Congress formally designated Uintah
Valley as a reservation—a location that the
governor of Utah declared was “most admirably adapted to that purpose.”100 In February 1865, a few months before the end of the
Civil War, Congress finally acted to extinguish
the “Indian title to lands in the Territory of
Utah suitable for agricultural and mineral
purposes.”101 While the federal government
normally moved “quickly to extinguish title
through formal treaties before or in the early
stages of white settlement,” in this instance
the government “as a result of Utah’s unique
situation, purposely allowed eighteen years
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Two Native American Utes standing in front of a tepee wearing decorative clothing including hair pipe breastplates, chokers,
and beaded leggings (between 1860–70). (Denver Public Library)

to pass before extinguishing native title and
providing for Indian removal to reservations.
Even then, Congress authorized the move
only because of an expected massive influx of
gentiles into the territory.”102
Connor and others felt that subsequent
events had justified the attack at Bear River.
One year after the massacre, the New York
Times reported that “the Bear River and
other conflicts . . . [pre]pared the way for the
subsequent treaties and the present burial of
the tomahawk, and were, in short, the main
causes of the peace which is now enjoyed
in the Territory and around its borders.”103
During July 1864, General Connor reported:
“The policy pursued toward the Indians has
had a most happy effect. That policy, as you
are aware, involved certain and speedy punishment for past offenses, compelling them to

sue for a suspension of hostilities, and on the
resumption of peace, kindness and leniency
toward the redskins. They fully understand
that honesty and peace constitute their best
and safest policy.”104 Yet by February 1865,
just seven months later, General Connor
reported that Indians had “again returned
in increased force” and suggested that the
“troops [stationed in Utah] are insufficient to
contend with them.”105
An 1865 article in the New York Times
commented on the continuing cycle of violence between Indians and white settlers:
“The Indian’s wrath is poured out, with
indiscriminate discrimination, upon the passing emigrant, or the industrious settler, and
thus a general character is given in a murderous struggle which commenced with a few.
. . . They will do a little stealing, get saucy,
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impudent, presuming, and when very ‘mad’
will be cruel and kill.” The violent cycle sometimes escalated when “whites, irritated and
provoked, even when the Indians do not murder, but steal only, shoot at the marauders, if a
sight can be obtained of them.”106 Utah’s 1865
superintendent of Indian affairs, Orsemus H.
Irish, offered his view that the “cruelties practiced by hostile savages have prejudiced our
people against the whole race. The emigrants
. . . and the officers and soldiers who are here
for their protection, are almost entirely in
favor of the extermination of all Indians. . . .
Under my observation and within my own
experience, I know of only one case of Indian
outrage and depredation that has not commenced
in the misconduct of the whites.”107
In 1865 the federal government took
action to resolve land ownership questions
in Utah. William P. Dole, commissioner of
Indian Affairs, directed Superintendent Irish
in February 1865 to negotiate additional
Indian treaties, as required, to place Utah’s
remaining Indians onto a reservation. The
commissioner additionally instructed Irish
that because the government had not previously accepted Indian titles to any land in
Utah, he was to ensure that the resulting
treaties were framed so that the Indians relinquished “the right of occupancy” to the lands
identified by Congress and moved to the
reservation land “reserved for their use.”108
Not all of the federal officers involved with
the resulting treaty negotiations were pleased
to resolve the confusion that existed in Utah
regarding land titles. Some government
officials “declared, that rather than associate
with Brigham Young on such an occasion,
they would [prefer to] have the negotiation
fail; that they would rather the Indians, than
the Mormons, would have the land.”109
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In the resulting Spanish Fork Treaty,
signed on June 8, 1865, Indians relinquished
the “right of possession to all of the lands
within Utah Territory occupied by them . . .
with the exception of the Uintah valley which
[was] to be reserved for their exclusive use.”
The treaty required Indians to give up their
Spanish Fork, San Pete, and Corn Creek
reservations. It also gave the president of the
United States authority to place other bands
of “friendly Indians” on the Uintah reservation without prior Indian approval, and the
Indian signatories agreed to move to the reservation “within one year after ratification of
the treaty.”110 Indians were to receive annual
payments of $25,000 for ten years, followed
by $20,000 per year for the next twenty
years, and finally $15,000 for an additional
thirty years. The United States Congress did
not ratify the treaty, though, and the government failed to pay the promised amounts.111

After the Civil War
While the Civil War ended in 1865, Utah’s
Indian problems did not. Toward the conclusion of the Civil War, a Utah-based New York
Times reporter complained, “What to do with
the red men is still a problem which, it appears,
cannot be satisfactorily solved. For this Spring
there seems to be as much chance of difficulties with them, all around, as ever. We hear of
Indian troubles [in Utah] from every quarter
nearly.”112 In the midst of the Civil War, an
article about Utah in the New York Times proclaimed that the “Indians here, as elsewhere,
dwindle away before the onward march of
the white man. Chief after chief is passing
away from the small Utah bands, until it is
said to be difficult to find eligible and aspiring
braves to fill the vacancies.”113 Indians found
an able commander and strategist, however,
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in the Ute chief Antonga (called Black Hawk
by the whites), who was able to consolidate factions of the Ute, Paiute, and Navajo
tribes.114 The same day—April 9, 1865—that
General Robert E. Lee surrendered to General
Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox, Virginia, is
often cited as the beginning of Utah’s Black
Hawk Indian War. The war continued off and
on, primarily in central and southern Utah,
for the next seven years. Most of the conflict
and skirmishes between Indians and white
settlers occurred between 1865 and 1867. In
1866, “Indian attacks were so damaging and
threats so ominous” that Mormon militia leaders required settlers to vacate twenty-seven
settlements in nine Utah counties.115 Dozens
of Utah settlers were killed during the Black
Hawk War. The number of Indians killed is
unknown, although it was no doubt higher
than the number of settler deaths.
While there were continuing Indian
problems in Utah Territory throughout the
Civil War, they dramatically escalated in the
years immediately after the war. By Civil War
standards, the total deaths on both sides were
insignificant, but the Black Hawk War had an
influence on the history and settlement of
central and southern Utah that was greater
than the loss of life would imply. The war was
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the last major challenge that Indians in Utah
Territory mounted against white authority
and encroachment. The last Utes were moved
onto the Uintah Reservation by 1882, marking the completion of a thirty-five year effort
to “reclaim and civilize the Indians” and place
them on reservations “for their permanent
and happy homes.”116 The Uintah reservation
is still in existence (and is known today as
the Uintah and Ouray Reservation). Covering
over 4.5 million acres, it is the second-largest
Indian reservation in the United States.117
Utah’s Indian society went into a steady
and irreversible decline after 1847 that culminated in marginalization on isolated reservations. The decades when white and Indian
societies lived in close proximity to each other
brought successes and failures. Charity and
violence were both in evidence as the cultures
intermingled and attempted to live with each
other. Benjamin Davies, an 1861 superintendent of Indian Affairs in Utah, perhaps said
it best when he inadvertently complimented
the local Mormon population by noting that
Utah’s Indians were “not so demoralized and
corrupted as those who have been brought
into closer association with white men in
other localities.”118 It is difficult to envision
how things could have ended differently.
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